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The core claim of evidentialism is that one ought to believe what one’s 
evidence supports: 
 
EVIDENTIALISM: One ought to believe what one’s evidence 
supports 
 
Many epistemologists think this is so obviously true as to be almost 
platitudinous.1 However, as it stands it doesn’t tell us much. What is 
evidence? When is evidence your evidence? How strongly must it support 
a proposition for belief to be the correct attitude to adopt? What is the 
evidential support relation? How should we interpret the ‘ought’ in 
 
1 The canonical defence of evidentialism is Conee & Feldman (2004), who remark that they 
initially thought it was “…sufficiently obvious to be in little need of defense” (2004: 1). The 
observation that it has the air of a platitude is often made. See, for instance, Dougherty (2011: 
6), and Piller (2016). The term ‘evidentialism’ is sometimes used specifically to describe 
Conee and Feldman’s view. Here we use it more broadly.  
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question? What is its logical form? To whom does evidentialism apply? 
What is its modal profile? Does it only apply to belief or does it also apply 
to other doxastic attitudes? Which ones? A fully-fledged evidentialist 
theory must answer these questions and many more. Thus, EVIDENTIALISM 
is schematic. It is compatible with a wide variety of answers, each of which 
will give us a different evidentialist theory. This may explain its appeal. 
Perhaps part of the reason evidentialism is so popular is that, with so 
many flavours on offer, most epistemologists have been able to find at 
least one to their taste. 
 
To see just how flexible EVIDENTIALISM is, consider two contrasting forms 
it could take. According to an externalist view we’ll call EXACTING 
EVIDENTIALISM, one’s evidence consists of all and only those propositions 
one knows to be true, and one may believe that p if and only if one’s 
evidence entails that p: 
 
EXACTING EVIDENTIALISM: One’s evidence consists of all and only 
those propositions one knows to be true. One may believe that p 
if and only if one’s evidence entails that p 
 
Since no falsehood is known and no set of truths entail a falsehood, one 
consequence of EXACTING EVIDENTIALISM is that one must never believe a 
falsehood. Many evidentialists will be unhappy with this consequence.2 
Evidentialists usually think that you ought to be rational, and that 
rationality is a matter of believing in accordance with your evidence.3 
Since it is sometimes rational to believe falsehoods, they will say that this 
form of evidentialism is too demanding.  
 
2 One exception is Williamson (2013, forthcoming) who embraces it. For criticism of 
Williamson, see Cohen & Comesana (2013, forthcoming) 
3 We will take on-board the assumption that you ought to be rational here. Williamson (2017) 
distinguishes between two notions of rationality and argues that on only one of them is 
rationality a matter of believing in accordance with you evidence.  
 
  3 
 
Consider instead, then, an evidentialism at the other end of the spectrum. 
According to an internalist view we’ll call EASY-GOING EVIDENTIALISM, 
one’s evidence consists of a subset of one’s non-factive mental states (one’s 
beliefs, phenomenal states, ‘intellectual seemings’, etc.), and one may 
believe that p if p is more probable on one’s evidence than not-p: 
 
EASY-GOING EVIDENTIALISM: One’s evidence consists of a subset of 
one’s non-factive mental states. One may believe that p if p is more 
probable on one’s evidence than not-p. 
 
EASY-GOING EVIDENTIALISM does not entail that one must never believe a 
falsehood. In fact, it is very undemanding indeed. Suppose you believe 
that the coin you are about to flip is biased 51% towards Heads, and none 
of your other non-factive mental states conflicts with this belief. EASY-
GOING EVIDENTIALISM says that you may believe that the coin will land 
heads even before flipping it and seeing the result. Many evidentialists 
will be unhappy with this consequence. Intuitively, rationality requires 
you to suspend judgement on how the coin will land until you see the 
result. For this reason, they will say, EASY-GOING EVIDENTIALISM is not 
demanding enough. 
 
There is a vast gulf between these two forms evidentialism could take.4 
Most epistemologists, whether they are internalists or externalists, would 
reject both and go for something in-between. But how should we narrow 
down the options? In this chapter, we’ll look at how empirical work on 
bias in cognitive and social psychology can help us to do so, and, 
ultimately, whether this work motivates rejecting evidentialism 
altogether. As we will see, the existence of biases has far-reaching 
 
4 Equally clearly, neither is a fully-fledged theory, but this is unimportant for our purposes. 
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One often-touted virtue of evidentialism is that it provides a principle for 
belief-formation that we are, despite all our flaws, capable of following, 
whilst at the same time being suitably connected to the epistemic telos of 
truth.5 Is that right? Empirical work on bias gives us a reason to be 
sceptical about the first claim. Over the last fifty years, cognitive and social 
psychologists have repeatedly put to the test Aristotle’s definition of man 
as a rational animal. Many have viewed the results as a blow to our self-
satisfied self-image. According to the dominant ‘irrationalist’ narrative, 
empirical work shows that we are prone to a range of irrational biases in 
reasoning and doxastic attitude formation.6 Since a comprehensive 
overview of this large body of research is impossible, we will focus here 
on a handful of biases that should be of special interest to epistemologists, 
and to evidentialists in particular. 
 
§2.1. Hindsight Bias 
 
First up: hindsight bias. This is a phenomenon whereby people who know 
the outcome of an event judge it to be more probable on the evidence 
available before the outcome than do people who are ignorant of the 
 
5 Conee & Feldman (2004), et al. It is sometimes argued that we should reject more demanding 
forms of evidentialism like EXACTING EVIDENTIALISM because we are not capable of following 
them. See Srinivasan (2015), Hughes (2019a) and Lasonen-Aarnio (2020) critical discussion 
of this idea. 
6 For a good overview, see Gilovich et al. (2002) 
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outcome. Neal Roese and Kathleen Vohs (2012) offer an example: “A voter 
might believe that after accepting the Democratic nomination for 
president in August 2008, Barack Obama’s chances of winning the U.S. 
presidency was about 60%. After Obama’s victory in November 2008, this 
same voter might look back, see the victory as more predictable than it 
was before the outcome was known, and conclude that Obama’s chances 
were at least 80% at the time of the convention”. Hundreds of studies have 
confirmed that people exhibit hindsight bias.7 It affects judgements about 
topics as diverse as terrorist attacks, medical diagnoses, and accounting 
and auditing decisions.8 It has been documented in people from a variety 
of cultures, and across age-groups.9 It is widely regarded by psychologists 
as irrational. 
 
§2.2. Biased Assimilation 
 
Next: biased assimilation. As Charles Lord et al. (1979) describe it, this is a 
tendency people have to “accept confirming evidence at face value whilst 
subjecting disconfirming evidence to critical evaluation, with the result 
that they draw undue support for their initial positions”. An example: 
Scott Plous (1991) selected two groups of experimental participants. The 
first group strongly supported the use of nuclear energy, the second group 
strongly opposed it. Both groups were given the same literature on the 
risks and rewards of nuclear energy. Each group drew support for their 
pre-existing views from the literature – the pro-nuclear-energy group 
judged that on balance the arguments within the literature supported its 
use, the anti-nuclear-energy group drew the opposite conclusion. Like 
hindsight bias, biased assimilation is robustly documented and widely 
 
7 Roese & Vohs (2012) 
8 For terrorist attacks, see Fischhoff et al. (2005). For medical diagnoses, see Arkes et al. (1988). 
For auditing decisions, see Peecher & Piercey (2010) 
9 RF. Pohl et al. (2002), Bernstein et al. (2011). 
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regarded by psychologists as irrational. Biased assimilation is often 
thought of as one part of a broader phenomenon known as ‘confirmation 
bias’. 
 
§2.3. Selective Exposure 
 
Raymond Nickerson describes confirmation bias as “…the seeking or 
interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, 
expectations, or a hypothesis in hand” (1998: 175). The ‘interpreting’ part 
is biased assimilation. The remainder – the seeking – is known as ‘selective 
exposure’. The observation that we prefer to gather evidence that confirms 
our pre-existing beliefs and avoid evidence that disconfirms them is not 
new. In 1620 Francis Bacon wrote that “The human understanding when 
it has once adopted an opinion (either as being the received opinion or as 
being agreeable to itself) draws all things else to support and agree with 
it”. (2008). A retro example: Sweeney and Gruber (1984) found that 
relative to Undecideds and supporters of George McGovern, Richard 
Nixon’s supporters reported less interest in, and paid less attention to, 
information related to the Watergate scandal. More recently, selective 
exposure has been invoked to explain the existence of online echo 
chambers.10 As with the other biases we have looked at it is empirically 
well-confirmed and widely regarded as irrational. 
 
§2.4. Implicit Bias 
 
Finally: implicit bias. This is a multifaceted concept. One aspect of it is a 
phenomenon whereby people’s judgements are unconsciously influenced 
 
10 Quattrociocchi et al. (2016) 
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by prejudices and stereotypes.11 For example, Jennifer Saul notes that 
“…the same CV is considered much better when it has a typically white 
rather than typically black name, a typically Swedish rather than typically 
Arab name, a typically male rather than typically female name, and so on”. 
(2013: 244) Unsurprisingly given its obvious ethical and political 
implications, implicit bias is one of the most studied and discussed human 
biases. Once again, beliefs formed as a result of the influence of the bias 






These are just a handful of a large number of biases in reasoning and 
doxastic attitude formation that empirical work in cognitive and social 
psychology appears to have uncovered. Taken at face value, this work 
seems to show that we aren’t nearly as good at believing what our 
evidence supports as many philosophers have assumed. Bad news for the 
Aristotelian image of man. Worse still, empirical work also suggests that 
we are usually quite clueless about our biases. Not because we’re lazy, but, 
because most biases operate at a sub-personal level we have little to no 
introspective access to their influence on us.12 As Timothy Wilson and 
Nancy Brekke put it, unlike bad food “Human judgements – even very 
bad ones – do not smell” (1994: 121).  
 
You might think that you’re an exception: others might not be able to 
recognise their biases, but you have a good nose, and your beliefs aren’t 
off. This is predictable. Studies by Emily Pronin and colleagues suggest 
 
11 For a useful introduction to the philosophical dimensions of implicit bias, see Brownstein 
(2019) 
12 Wilson (2002) 
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that whilst people are reasonably good at detecting bias in others, they are, 
by-and-large, blind to the influence of their own biases.13 They 
hypothesize that this asymmetry can be explained by what they call 
‘introspection illusion’ – the illusion that introspection is more reliable a 
method of gaining knowledge of one’s thoughts, feelings, motives, 
intentions, and other aspects of one’s mind than it actually is. Kristoffer 
Ahlstrom-Vij summarises the point nicely: “Since the processes that give 
rise to bias tend to operate on a sub-personal level, outside the scope of 
our introspective gaze, our search [for them] tends to come up empty. 
From the fact that our search comes up empty, we then infer an absence of 
bias – despite the fact that such a search is more or less guaranteed to come 
up empty, given the inaccessibility of the relevant mechanisms” (2013: 
280).14 
 
The fact that the influence of many of our biases is introspectively 
undetectable makes debiasing difficult. Ahlstrom-Vij identifies two 
hurdles. First, since people don’t see themselves as biased, they are not 
motivated to engage in debiasing in the first place – if it ain’t broke, why 
fix it? Second, even when people can be persuaded to engage in debiasing 
efforts there is a risk of both undercorrection and overcorrection. Studies 
on debiasing have shown that we are prone to both errors.15 In general, the 
results of work on debiasing are disappointing. It is possible to reduce (if 
not eradicate) the influence of certain biases, but only with time and effort, 





13 Pronin (2009) 
14 Kornblith (2012) also makes this point 
15 Wilson (2002) 
 




According to the irrationalist narrative we are riddled with all manner of 
biases and there is little we can do about it. It is not difficult to find 
implications for evidentialism within this story. For one thing, it is hard to 
see how it can be squared with internalism. Ultimately, I think this is 
correct. Indeed, I think that unconscious biases have profound 
implications for the formulation of evidentialism and may even require us 
to give it up altogether. But before we see just why this is, it will be useful 
to first look at how some psychologists and philosophers have pushed 
back against the irrationalist narrative. Not everyone agrees that the 
situation is as bleak as irrationalists portray it to be. 
 
One source of resistance points to the recent replication crisis in 
psychology. Many of the seminal studies which kick-started the 
irrationalist narrative have not been successfully replicated.16 This casts 
some doubt on the narrative. Another does not question the studies 
themselves, but rather their interpretation. According to one school of 
thought, most closely associated with Gerd Gigerenzer and the ABC 
research group, many of our so-called biases should not be thought of as 
irrational, but rather ‘ecologically rational’ – rational for creatures like 
ourselves with limited time and computational powers, who cannot 
conform to the canons of ideal rationality.17 In effect, the proposal is that 
the cognitive rules we employ that give rise to biases are the best rules for 
us to employ, given our limitations. We would do worse at achieving our 
epistemic goals (truth, knowledge, etc.) were we to attempt to use more 
 
16 Camerer et al. (2018). 
17 Gigerenzer et al. (2001). Bishop and Trout have put this idea to work in epistemology 
(Bishop 2000, Bishop & Trout 2004). 
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reliable rules.18 This line of thought should be of interest to those engaged 
in non-ideal epistemology. 
 
Finally, some epistemologists have questioned the philosophical 
assumptions made by irrationalists. In a recent article Brian Hedden (2019) 
has argued that, contrary to received wisdom, hindsight bias is often a 
perfectly rational response to one’s evidence, and not (just) because it is 
ecologically rational – Hedden maintains that hindsight bias need not 
even constitute a violation of ideal rationality. Simplifying greatly, he 
argues that knowledge of an outcome often provides one with a certain 
kind of higher-order evidence: in particular, it provides one with evidence 
about the evidence that was available before the outcome. Hedden argues 
that correctly responding to this higher-order evidence will often lead one 
to display hindsight bias, and that, as a result, this ‘bias’ need not be in 
breach of evidentialism’s imperative. In a similar vein, Thomas Kelly 
(2008) and Kevin Dorst (ms.) have used sophisticated theories of higher-
order evidence to push back against the idea that confirmation bias is 
irrational.  
 
It is worth also noting that some evidentialists will be unbothered by 
selective exposure in the first place. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman 
(2004, 2011) maintain that even if a person’s evidence only favours 
believing that p because they avoided evidence against p, the resulting 
belief that p is still epistemically rational. This is because they regard 
norms of evidence-gathering as practical, rather than epistemic norms 
(Kelly agrees). Hence, they will deny that a propensity for selective 
exposure casts doubt on our ability to conform with evidentialism. 
Evidentialism, they will say, is a thesis about what you should believe 
given the evidence you actually have; not about what evidence you should 
have. Finally, Bernhard Salow (2017) has argued that it is impossible to 
 
18 Of course, even rules that take into account our limitations will sometimes be misapplied.   
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intentionally, knowingly, seek out confirming evidence and avoid 
disconfirming evidence. However, this is compatible with the possibility 






None of Hedden, Kelly, or Dorst would claim that they have debunked 
the irrationalist narrative. They do not claim to have shown that every 
purported cognitive bias is, or could be, epistemically rational. Nor do 
they claim that the biases they discuss are necessarily rational; only that 
they can be under certain circumstances. Even if we accept Hedden’s 
arguments, it may be that our actual hindsight judgements do not 
normally fit with the evidence because we systematically overestimate the 
import of the higher-order evidence. Similarly, even if we accept Kelly and 
Dorst’s arguments it may be that our actual tendency to seek confirming 
evidence over disconfirming evidence is too pronounced, or that we give 
too little weight to disconfirming evidence and too much weight to 
confirming evidence, with the result that we violate the evidentialist 
imperative. 
 
Nevertheless, this work does at least call the irrationalist narrative into 
question. Arguably, it shows that psychologists have been philosophically 
naïve. When we also take into account the replication crisis and alternative 
‘ecological’ interpretations of the data, perhaps the most reasonable stance 
to take towards the irrationalist narrative is to suspend judgement. Maybe 
it is correct, but the case has not yet been decisively made. 
 
Does this mean that reflection on cognitive biases cannot tell us anything 
about the formulation and prospects of evidentialism? Not necessarily. To 
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see why we need to consider its modal profile. Proponents of the view are 
not always clear on this, but there are good reasons to think that if 
evidentialism is true, it is necessarily true. Otherwise a lot of the literature 
would be hard to make sense of. It is difficult to see how modally remote 
worlds populated by envatted agents, evil epistemic demons, Boltzmann 
brains, philosophical zombies, infallible oracles, and the like could tell us 
anything about evidentialism were it merely contingently true: true for us 
in the actual world but not necessarily true for other agents in other 
worlds. These worlds, being modally remote, would simply be irrelevant. 
Yet, evidentialists do not treat them as irrelevant; they go to great lengths 
to accommodate them.19      
 
This raises the question of what kind of necessity evidentialism is 
supposed to have. The obvious answer is: metaphysical. But whatever it 
is, the fact that it has at least enough modal strength to encompass these 
exotic worlds means that we need not wait for psychology to vindicate or 
debunk the irrationalist narrative to make use of it in shaping and 
assessing evidentialism. All we need is for the narrative to describe a 
possibility. And that it surely does. Whether or not we are actually prone 
to hindsight, confirmation, and implicit bias, we could have been, and 
these biases could have operated in a way that leads to violations of 
evidentialism. Moreover, their influence on us could have been 
introspectively inaccessible.  
 
With this in mind, consider a possible biased agent, Blixa. Let us stipulate 
that Blixa is unconsciously influenced by hindsight, confirmation, and 
implicit bias, with the result that he often unwittingly forms irrational 
beliefs that are not supported by his evidence – he goes beyond anything 
that ecological rationality or Hedden, Kelly, and Dorst’s, arguments 
 
19 Smithies (2019) defence of internalist evidentialism, for instance, discusses all of these 
worlds. 
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would license. Blixa might be an actual person. But even if he is not, he is 
a possible person, and that suffices for our purposes. What does the 






Firstly, it tells us that access internalist versions of evidentialism are 
untenable. According to access internalists, one is always in a position to 
know which propositions it is rational for one to believe at any given 
time.20 Many of Blixa’s beliefs are irrational in virtue of their biased 
etiologies. But since the influence of these biases is unconscious, Blixa is 
not in a position to know that they are irrational. It follows that access 
internalism is false.21 Call this ‘the problem of inaccessibility’. 
 
The possibility of Blixa also causes trouble for other internalist 
evidentialisms. According to internalist ‘mentalism’, the rationality of a 
belief supervenes on one’s non-factive mental states.22 Plugging this idea 
into the evidentialist schema, we get the result that one’s evidence is 
comprised entirely of one’s non-factive mental states and that what one 
 
20 See Smithies (2019) for an extended argument for access internalism. Many access 
internalists, including Smithies, use the language of ‘justification’ rather than ‘rationality’. 
However, they almost always take the two to be synonymous. 
21 I am not the first to point out that the possibility of bad unconscious etiologies causes 
problems for internalism. Puddifoot (2016) argues that implicit bias creates difficulties for 
the view. Srinivasan (forthcoming) argues that it cannot handle beliefs caused by internalised 
classist, racist, and sexist ideologies. Siegel (2017) argues that beliefs formed on the basis of 
perceptual experiences with ‘hijacked’ etiologies are irrational. Since hijacked agents are not 
usually in a position to know that their experiences have been hijacked, this is a problem for 
access internalism.  
22 This is Conee & Feldman’s (2004) view. 
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ought to believe is determined entirely by these states. It is not clear how 
this proposal can be reconciled with the idea that whether a belief is the 
result of bias can affect its rational standing. Reconciliation requires 
proponents of mentalism to show that hindsight, confirmation, and 
implicit bias can be adequately described solely in terms of non-factive 
mental states. It is far from obvious that this can be done. Psychologists 
working on bias do not take evidence to consist of non-factive mental 
states. Rather, they almost always (implicitly) take it to consist of worldly 
facts. So, any internalist re-description of the relevant biases will need to 
‘internalise’ the evidence. The worry is that this process of internalisation 
will result in non-factive mental states that are caused by bias counting as 
evidence. For example, internalists often take an agent’s evidence to 
consist in, inter alia, how things ‘seem’ or ‘appear’ to the agent. There is a 
risk of cases in which it seems or appears to the agent that p only because 
of the influence of bias. A study by B. Keith Payne (2001) found that 
participants primed with pictures of black faces were more likely to 
incorrectly identify pictures of tools as guns than were participants 
primed with pictures of white faces. Payne hypothesises that this can be 
explained by the influence of implicit bias. Did it seem or appear to the 
participants primed with black faces that the picture is of a gun? The 
natural answer is ‘yes’. If so, then this study illustrates the problem. Call 
it the ‘problem of laundered biases’.23 
 
Internalist evidentialism faces another, related, problem (one that, as we 
will see, it shares with certain kinds of externalist evidentialism). Suppose 
that, unconsciously wanting to believe that people like him, Blixa engages 
in selective exposure: he gathers up all the evidence he can to support this 
belief and avoids acquiring counterevidence.24 Is it then rational for Blixa 
 
23 C.f. Siegel (2017). 
24 In order to side-step Salow’s (2017) arguments, we can stipulate that Blixa does not do this 
intentionally. 
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to believe that people like him? Arguably not. The resulting belief is 
tainted by the means by which the evidence for it was acquired. To avoid 
having to say that the belief is rational, evidentialists will need to 
complicate their view. In addition to the condition that one must believe 
what one’s evidence supports they will need to add a further condition: 
one must not selectively expose oneself to evidence.25 Insofar as the 
motivation for introducing this condition is ad hoc, this is a theoretical cost; 
the condition is, it seems, not introduced as a natural extension of the core 
evidentialist idea, but rather simply to patch up the theory against 
criticism. Call this the ‘problem of selective exposure’. As mentioned 
earlier, some evidentialists will insist that Blixa’s belief is rational, 
reasoning that the rationality of evidence-gathering is a practical rather 
than an epistemic matter. But there are reasons to be sceptical of this 
response. Later on, we will look at a theory of epistemic rationality 







Internalists might bite the bullet, of course. They might argue that the 
influence of unconscious biases has no effect on the rational standing of a 
belief: biased beliefs can nevertheless be rational beliefs. The claim would 
not be that such beliefs can be rational because they are ecologically 
rational (Gigerenzer’s line), nor because the alleged ‘biases’ are no such 
thing (Hedden, Kelly, and Dorst’s line). Rather, internalists might 
acknowledge that biased beliefs are epistemically suboptimal but 
maintain that since the influence of the relevant biases is unconscious it 
 
25 C.f. Greco (2005), Baehr (2011), Miracchi (2019), Flores & Woodard (ms.) 
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cannot make a difference to rationality, nor, ipso facto, to what one ought 
to believe. They might, for instance, insist that seemings and appearances 
with biased etiologies are evidence, and that beliefs based on them are 
rational in virtue of being supported by the evidence.  
 
As uncomfortable a position as this is to adopt, a certain kind of internalist 
may be drawn to it. Many philosophers see a tight connection between 
obligation, blame, and control. According to one broadly Kantian line of 
thought, at least as popular in ethics as it is in epistemology, if one is 
blameless for φ-ing, it cannot be that one ought to have done anything 
other than φ, and an outcome that is beyond one’s control, no matter how 
unfortunate, is not an outcome for which one can be blamed. It follows 
that it is always in one’s control to do as one ought to. Internalists who 
endorse this line of thought and maintain that one ought to be rational will 
infer that one cannot be blamelessly irrational, and that the rationality of 
a belief cannot depend on factors beyond one’s control. Since unconscious 
influences on belief are, in some fairly strong sense, outside of one’s 
control, these internalists will say that they cannot make a difference to 
rationality. And since they cannot make a difference to rationality, they 
cannot make a difference to what one ought to believe.  
 
The reasoning here is suspect in a number of ways. Here we will only look 
at its implausible consequences. Consider these passages from a short 
story by Vladimir Nabokov:26 
 
“What he really wanted to do was to tear a hole in his world and 
escape…"Referential mania," Herman Brink had called it. In these 
very rare cases the patient imagines that everything happening 
around him is a veiled reference to his personality and 
existence…Phenomenal nature shadows him wherever he goes. 
 
26 ‘Signs and Symbols’ (1948) 
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Clouds in the staring sky transmit to one another, by means of 
slow signs, incredibly detailed information regarding him. His 
inmost thoughts are discussed at nightfall, in manual alphabet, by 
darkly gesticulating trees. Pebbles or stains or sun flecks form 
patterns representing in some awful way messages which he must 
intercept. Everything is a cipher and of everything he is the theme. 
Some of the spies are detached observers, such are glass surfaces 
and still pools; others, such as coats in store windows, are 
prejudiced witnesses, lynchers at heart; others again (running 
water, storms) are hysterical to the point of insanity, have a 
distorted opinion of him and grotesquely misinterpret his actions. 
He must be always on his guard and devote every minute and 
module of life to the decoding of the undulation of things.”27 
 
The correct response here is not blame, but pity. This is, in part, because 
the man has no control over his delusions – he is more a victim of them 
than he is their architect. Yet it is perfectly clear that he is profoundly 
irrational. There is more to rationality than mere blamelessness. So there 
is no motivation for rejecting the idea that unconscious biases can affect 







27 ‘Referential Mania’ is a fictional disorder, but we could easily replace it with documented 
real-world monothematic delusions. People with somatoparaphrenia believe that one or 
more of their limbs belongs to someone else. People with Cotard delusion believe that they 
are dead or do not exist. People with Capgras delusion believe that a loved-one has been 
replaced by an identical-looking imposter. In each case, sufferers produce elaborate 
confabulations to explain away evidence to the contrary. 
 




Internalist versions of evidentialism have a hard time accounting for the 
irrationality of biased beliefs. Do externalist versions fare better? At first 
glance at least some of them seem to. Consider, for instance, EXACTING 
EVIDENTIALISM. A reminder, it says that:  
 
EXACTING EVIDENTIALISM: One’s evidence consists of all and only 
those propositions one knows to be true. One may believe that p 
iff one’s evidence entails that p 
 
EXACTING EVIDENTIALISM does not by itself deliver the result that biased 
beliefs are irrational. This is because it is about the conditions under which 
one has justification to believe that p, not about the conditions under 
which a belief that p is justified. In other words, it is about propositional 
rather than doxastic justification. For all EXACTING EVIDENTIALISM says, 
one’s belief that p may be rational even though it is the result of bias, 
provided that one’s knowledge entails that p, even if one’s belief isn’t 
based on that entailing knowledge. However, proponents of EXACTING 
EVIDENTIALISM will not accept this verdict. They will supplement the view 
with a theory of doxastic justification. An obvious supplement is the 
theory that one’s belief is justified just in case it is knowledge.28 And this 
view – the ‘knowledge norm of belief’ – can easily explain why bias-
infected beliefs are not rational: a biased etiology usually precludes a belief 
from being knowledge.  
 
At least one version of externalist evidentialism appears to be able to 
account for the irrationality of biased beliefs, then. Externalists should not 
 
28 Sutton (2005, 2007), Littlejohn (2013, 2019), Williamson (2013, forthcoming) 
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be too sanguine, however. As we have already noted, most 
epistemologists will be unhappy with EXACTING EVIDENTIALISM, the 
knowledge norm of belief, and similar truth-entailing views. If anything 
is consensus in epistemology, it is that false beliefs can be rational. If you 
mistakenly believe that the white table in front of you is red because, 
unbeknownst to you, it is illuminated by a red light source, then you are 
no less rational than your counterpart in the next room who is looking at 
a red table. If EXACTING EVIDENTIALISM and the knowledge norm are taken 
to be claims about rationality, then, they will be roundly rejected. If they 
are divorced from rationality and merely taken to be claims about what 
one ought to believe, then most epistemologists will reject them on the 
grounds that one ought to be rational.29 This raises a question: is there a 
plausible externalist evidentialism that explains why biased beliefs are 
irrational whilst at the same time delivering the result that false beliefs can 
be rational? We should not assume a positive answer. It is incumbent on 
externalist evidentialists to show us that there is. Call this the ‘problem of 
false beliefs’.  
 
Finally, consider again one of the problems that internalist evidentialism 
faces: the problem of selective exposure. An evidentialism according to 
which one should only believe what one knows doesn’t face this problem, 
since a belief that is the product of selective exposure to the evidence will 
not usually be a knowledgeable belief. However, a less demanding 
externalist evidentialism will face the problem. Take, for example, a view 
according to which one’s evidence consists of one’s knowledge, and one 
may believe that p if and only if p is sufficiently probable on one’s 
evidence above some threshold n = <1. This view faces the problem of 
 
29 One consequence of demanding views like EXACTING EVIDENTIALISM and the knowledge 
norm is that one ought sometimes to have irrational beliefs (Hughes 2017, 2019b). Elsewhere 
I have argued that the best solution to this problem is to accept that there can be epistemic 
dilemmas: situations in which one is subject to conflicting epistemic requirements. See 
Hughes (2019a). 
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selective exposure as much as internalist evidentialism does. And like the 
internalist, the externalist will have to complicate their view in an ad hoc 






Whether it is given an internalist or an externalist spin, evidentialism 
struggles to handle bias. Internalist evidentialists face the problem of 
inaccessibility, the problem of laundered biases, and the problem of 
selective exposure. Externalist evidentialists fare somewhat better, but still 
face the problem of selective exposure and also face the problem of false 
beliefs. In light of all this, it is tempting to think that we should give up 
evidentialism altogether. But are there non-evidentialist theories that do 
better? 
 
It seems that there are. Consider dispositionalism. This is the view that 
whether a belief is rational or not depends on the dispositions that it 
manifests. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio argues that a belief is rational just in case 
it manifests a disposition that is conducive to knowledge: the disposition 
results in knowledge across a range of normal cases.30 Lasonen-Aarnio 
argues that your belief that the table in the room is red is rational since it 
is the result of a knowledge-conducive disposition: in the relevant 
counterfactual worlds, you would have only believed that the table is red 
if you had known that it is red. We can plausibly add that those beliefs of 
Blixa’s that are the result of the influence of hindsight, confirmation, or 
implicit bias are not the manifestation of knowledge-conducive 
dispositions. Blixa forms (and would form) these beliefs even when they 
 
30 Lasonen-Aarnio (2010, forthcoming). See also Williamson (2017, forthcoming) 
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do not amount to knowledge. If so, then dispositionalism is able to account 
for the irrationality of biased beliefs and to solve the problem of false 
beliefs. It also solves the problem of selective exposure without having to 
resort to ad hoc manoeuvres. A belief that is caused or sustained by 
selective exposure to the evidence, it is natural to think, is likewise not a 
belief that manifests a knowledge-conducive disposition. Other theories, 
such as those that focus on epistemic virtues may also be capable of 
solving these problems whilst marking biased beliefs as irrational.31 We 






The possibility of unconscious cognitive biases has significant 
implications for epistemology. The irrationality of beliefs influenced by 
such biases cannot be explained by internalist evidentialism and raises 
significant challenges for externalist evidentialism. By contrast, at least 
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